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Private inspection of international shipments has 
been used over the last half-century for a variety of 
purposes. These include prevention of capital flight and 
improvement of import duty collection, among others. 
The existing literature has failed to find much impact 
of these inspection programs on collected tariff revenue 
or corruption at the border. This paper explores the 
“facilitation” effect of private inspection programs on 
trade. The results indicate that private inspection has a 
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positive and significant trade-facilitation effect. These 
programs raise import volumes for countries using them 
by approximately 2 to 10 percent. The findings here also 
suggest that the benefit of private inspection of imports 
may be associated with reforms and best practices applied 
by private inspection firms. Private firms’ inspection of 
cargo may promote faster clearance times and process 
reliability, rather than improved tax collection.Do Private Inspection Programs  
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1. Introduction 
Private inspection of international trade shipments, whether at embarkation or at 
disembarkation, has been used over the last half-century for a variety of purposes. In the 
1970s, when capital controls and exchange-rate regulations were widespread, governments 
used pre-shipment inspection (PSI) to prevent under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing 
of imports, two common forms of capital flight. As exchange-rate misalignment and capital 
controls progressively receded in the late 1980s, governments turned to PSI to assist weak and 
corrupt customs to improve import-duty collection.
2 In both cases, the vast majority of client 
governments were in developing countries and PSI was sometimes pressed on less-than-
enthusiastic governments by donors. Since the adoption in 2002 of the US Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), inspection was used for an altogether different purpose −to control the risk of 
smuggling weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist networks. Client 
governments for this type of service are typically industrial countries rather than developing 
ones, and the purpose of the inspection is to check the exact nature of the shipment rather 
than its value. Both CSI and PSI are elements which impact the transparency of the trading 
environment of nations and ought to be looked at carefully (on this, see Helble et al., 2009). 
In all cases, private inspection entails potential costs to traders and thus, ultimately, to final 
consumers. First, private inspection costs are typically billed to the importing country 
government and the fees can be substantial (up to 1% of shipment value). Second, inspection 
can slow down the logistics at embarkation and disembarkation points. The physical form of 
inspection varies and technology, soft and hard, has greatly improved the way it is done. Best 
practices today combine scanning (which in itself takes only a few minutes for each container, 
but often creates bottlenecks in harbor logistics) with random inspection based on risk-
assessment techniques (e.g. “profiling” of traders and transit companies). Nevertheless, even 
if technology has made inspection less burdensome than it used to be, time to export is a 
significant determinant of comparative advantage for a country (cf. Wilson and Li, 2009) and 
speed very much defines competitive advantage in the logistics industry - (on this see e.g. 
Shawdon 2006), and thus concerns have been recently voiced about the nuisance potential of 
                                                             
2 The first PSI program set up with the mission of improving import-tax collection was 
Indonesia’s, in 1985. The mission was then to curb import under-invoicing instead of over-
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mandatory inspection programs.
3 Regions like Sub-Saharan Africa suffer from already high 
trading costs and the apprehension stemming from increased pre-shipment controls are 
understandable
4.  
Because the CSI is relatively new, it is too early to assess its effect on aggregate trade flows. By 
contrast, evidence on pre-shipment inspection (PSI) and more recent Destination Inspection 
(DI) programs is readily available since it has been in use for many years, and the experience 
should be relevant since the inspection techniques are essentially the same irrespective of 
what the inspection is done for.
5 The idea of this paper is thus to draw from the experience of 
private inspection programs (PSI and DI) to assess whether inspection affects trade flows and, 
if so, how. 
“Private inspection” designates a service provided by a private company to a client 
government that consists of inspecting –selectively or systematically—cargoes bound for the 
client government’s country. The inspection can be performed at the embarkation port, prior 
to loading onto the vessel (“pre-shipment inspection” or PSI), or at the disembarkation port, 
after unloading (“destination inspection” or DI). The list of programs is given in Appendix 1. 
The needs underlying the demand for inspection services have evolved over time. Early 
concerns focused on the manipulation of transfer prices by multinational companies to go 
around capital controls. This was characteristic for the 1970s when capital controls and 
exchange-rate regulations were widespread. At the time, the governments used pre-shipment 
inspection (PSI) to prevent under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports, two 
common forms of capital flight. These governments were mainly located in the centre of the 
African continent, including Congo, Kenya and Tanzania. 
As exchange-rate misalignment and capital controls progressively receded in the late 1980s, 
governments from developing countries turned to PSI to assist customs to improve import-
duty collection. This time, international donors encouraged adopting inspection programs. 
Developing countries, in general, comparing to the industrial countries tend to have higher 
                                                             
3 These concerns have been voiced in professional publications lsuch as the Journal of 
Commerce or Traffic World, in particular in the CSI context. Of particular concern are the 24-
hour rule and the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism program. See also 
Edmonson (2006). Shawdon (2006) also reports concerned voiced in a series of interviews 
conducted with 52 intercontinental shippers. Giermanski (2007) however discusses how new 
technology like “smart containers” can mitigate the slowing-down effect of inspection.  
4 Portugal-Perez and Wilson (2009) provide an overview of the barriers to trade in Africa 
5 The technology, however, has changed as scanning has become sufficiently cheap to be used 
in almost all ports and is used by DI. Page | 4  
 
marginal tax rates on imports (Burgess and Stern, 1993). This is because the imports taxes 
often represent the main source of the overall tax revenue for this group of countries. High 
import tax rates lead to large rent-seeking opportunities for Importers but also for Customs 
well placed to take advantage. As a result, these countries are faced with a relatively large 
Customs corruption problem. PSI offers a simple solution to this problem with a certain cost 
(typically between 0.5% and 1% of import value). PSI performs the verification of the price 
and the classification of goods before their departure and then transmits the correct 
information to the Customs Service at the point of destination and, sometimes, to the 
destination country Ministry of Finance in advance of the arrival of goods. 
Although initially perceived by importers as an intruder, PSI survived. In 1988 the WTO gave 
an official approval by establishing the Agreement on Preshipment Inspection within its 
framework. As a result, the program extended to Latin American and South Asia often as part 
of the “Structural Adjustment Programs”. The list of programs adopted simultaneously with 
IMF programs is given in Appendix 2. 
Inspired by a new customs valuation method developed by the WTO in the late 1990’s, private 
inspection developed a new package of services provided at destination, i.e., in the client’s 
country. Known as Destination Inspection, the service offers reduced clearance times by 
combining best practices like scanning (which takes only a few minutes for each container) 
and computerized risk management system (e.g. “profiling” of traders and transit companies). 
After the introduction of the new service, many countries (like Ghana and Tanzania) shifted 
from PSI to DI and quality control. Also late 1990, former Soviet Bloc countries (like Moldova 
or Uzbekistan) joined the program for a short transition period again as part of the structural 
adjustment programs. 
Characterizing the period after 9/11 and the adoption in 2002 of the US Container Security 
Initiative (CSI), inspection started to be used for a quite different purpose − to control the risk 
of smuggling of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorist networks. Potential 
client governments for this type of services are from all countries and the purpose of the 
inspection is to check the exact nature of the shipment rather than its value.  
Although private inspection and PSI have always been controversial, the empirical literature 
on its effects is relatively limited and its results are ambiguous. Low (1995) surveyed the 
evidence from an institutional point of view and noted that performance varied widely 
depending on the form of the contract and on the relationship between the surveillance Page | 5  
 
company and the client government.
6 However one empirical regularity was that capacity 
building (the transfer of knowledge by private surveillance companies to customs) was 
typically the weak point of PSI. Yang (2005) studied the Philippines’ PSI program and showed 
that when a new origin country was covered, imports from that country were deflected to the 
Philippines’ export-processing zones and then fraudulently brought into the domestic market. 
Thus, the program was generating new forms of fraud rather than curbing it. Anson et al. 
(2006) studied four PSI programs and showed that they had two effects working at cross-
purposes. On one hand, PSI generates valuable information that the client government can 
use to curb fraud. On the other hand, it de-motivates customs administrations, so that part of 
the information brought in by the private company simply substitutes for slackening customs 
effort. Using a simple model they showed that the “perverse” effect (customs de-motivation) 
can sometimes more than offset the direct effect, resulting in less duty collection rather than 
more, and verified that this indeed seemed to be the case in Argentina and Indonesia. Yang 
(2008) was more positive, showing that PSI did have some effect in curbing customs 
corruption.  
This literature leaves an important question unanswered. Improving tax collection for budget 
purposes is one thing; encouraging trade is another. A vast literature suggests that trade 
openness is correlated with economic growth (for a recent empirical investigation of this link, 
see Wacziarg and Welsh 2008). Another strand of literature highlights the importance of 
trade facilitation in encouraging trade, relative to the reduction in traditional tariff and non-
tariff barriers (see e.g. Wilson, Mann and Otsuki 2003, Portugal-Perez and Wilson 2010). 
Does private inspection encourage trade? Private surveillance companies typically bring with 
them best practices in terms of customs and transit procedures, potentially resulting in 
shorter and less variable clearance times. This could encourage trade, partly or totally 
offsetting the slowing-down effect discussed above.  
In their study analyzing the relationship between trade facilitation, trade flows and GDP per 
capita in the Asia-Pacific region (for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation’s members), 
Wilson et al,(2003) define and measure trade facilitation using four different indicators for 
port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment, and electronic-business usage.  
They further introduce these indicators in an augmented gravity equation specification. They 
estimate their model solely in a cross-section context though, for the Asia-Pacific countries. In 
the absence of specific empirical data, the authors rely on survey information in order to 
construct the four indicators. Their sources are as diverse as to include the World Economic 
                                                             
6 Ramirez (1992) and Byrne (1995) also provide brief discussions as to the pros and cons of 
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Forum Global Competitiveness report as well as the World Competitiveness Yearbook from 
IMD Lausanne and the Maritime Transport Costs and Port Efficiency from the World Bank 
Group. This data is not always available for all countries. In addition it can only be used with 
caution, while resulting mostly from qualitative analysis.  
Our study differs from the paper of Wilson et al. (2003) as we do not try to measure trade 
facilitation as such. Instead we set up to isolate and evaluate the causal effect of one program 
assumed here to affect trade and then interpret its effect given the knowledge we have about 
the program specific characteristics. In this case the robustness of the method of estimation is 
more important. 
We set out to explore the effect of private inspection on trade volumes in this paper, using the 
most common vehicle to test the effect of policy changes on trade volumes: the gravity 
equation. We estimate a standard version of the gravity equation with importer and exporter 
fixed effects on a large panel of countries tracked over twenty-six years.  
Estimating the effect of private inspection on trade flows is a standard case of “treatment 
effects”. We use a difference-in-differences (DID) estimator which consists, intuitively, of 
comparing the difference in an outcome variable (here the volume of trade) between before 
and after the treatment for a “treatment group” (here the countries that had private inspection 
programs at some point) and for a “control group” (here the countries that never had private 
inspection programs). The average effect of the treatment on the treated is then the estimate 
of the coefficient on a dummy variable equal to one during the treatment period (private 
inspection program) for the treatment group (private inspection-using countries).  
DID estimation raises two specific issues. First, as discussed in Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mullainathan (2004), possible serial correlation in the outcome variable (here trade) is 
exacerbated by very strong autocorrelation in the treatment variable (a binary variable that 
changes value only once or twice in the sample period). The result, they show, is a high 
probability of type-I error (rejecting the null hypothesis of no effect when it is true, i.e. when 
there is no effect).
7 We control for this using the two-step method suggested in their paper. In 
the first stage, we run a standard panel gravity equation for all countries and years and 
retrieve the residuals. In the second stage, we keep those residuals only for the treatment 
group (countries that had a private inspection program at some point), take their without- and 
                                                             
7 Performing repeated estimations on “manufactured data” with non-existent (placebo) 
treatments, they showed that the null was rejected in up to half the cases when it should be no 
more than 5% if standard errors had been correctly estimated.  Page | 7  
 
with-treatment averages, and run a panel regression on the resulting two-period panel with a 
dummy for the treatment period.  
Second, when the treatment is a policy −as it is here− its assignment is at least partly the 
voluntary decision of the treated. Therefore, it depends on observed and unobserved 
characteristics of the country. If it depended only on observed characteristics (“selection on 
observables”) those could be controlled for in the treatment-effect regression. But if it also 
depends also on unobservable characteristics correlated with trade volumes, there will be 
correlation between one regressor (the dummy variable marking private inspection 
treatment) and the error term. OLS estimates will then be biased. We address this 
endogeneity bias in several ways. First, following the tradition in the policy-evaluation 
literature, we use fixed effects to control for unobserved time-invariant country characteristics 
that might affect both their trade performance and their willingness to adopt a private 
inspection program. However, as discussed in Besley and Case (2000), this fix may not be 
sufficient if omitted characteristics are time-variant. They suggest an instrumental-variable 
approach in which domestic political factors are used as instruments. We follow this approach 
and instrument PSI by governance indicators and their squares.  
For robustness, we compare our IV estimates with those obtained from Blundell and Bond’s 
system-GMM.
8 We also check for “fortuitous” policy effects by running our DID regression 
with fictitious starting points for private inspection programs, five years before and after the 
program was implemented, and comparing the measured effects with those when the true 
starting date was used. If effects are apparent several years before  private inspection 
programs are put in place, it is likely that those measured effects are fortuitous.  
The results so far suggest a positive effect of private inspection on trade volumes, with 
plausible magnitudes –roughly between 5% and 10% of trade volumes. The effect survives our 
various robustness checks and seems, as far as we can tell from aggregate data, to vindicate 
the anecdotal evidence on improvements in transit environments brought about by private 
firms as part of inspection contracts. 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and estimation issues, section 3 
discusses the results, and section 4 concludes.  
                                                             
8 System-GMM runs two equations, one in levels and one in first differences, in which 
endogenous RHS variables are instrumented in the level equation by first differences and in 
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2. Data & estimation 
2.1 Data  
The sample is a panel including 179 importing countries and 170 exporting countries over 
1980-2005, or a notional total of 791,180 one-way trade observations, of which 321,348 have 
positive trade (41%).  
The dependent variable is the aggregate one-way trade value reported in the IMF’s Direction 
of Trade Statistics (DOTS). It is customary in trade-volume studies to “mirror” export 
statistics, i.e. to disregard direct export statistics from the exporting country and instead to 
use import data from its partners. The reason is that customs typically monitor imports (on 
which duties are based) better than exports (rarely taxed). However our study purports to 
measure only the trade-facilitation effect of PSI, not its effect on the capacity of customs to 
record imports correctly. Mirrored import data would confound these two effects and would 
thus potentially bias results upward, generating a statistical illusion of increased volumes. In 
order to avoid this source of bias, we use direct export statistics, at the cost of having noisier 
data than if we had used mirroring. 
Standard gravity regressors include GDPs in constant 1995 dollars, taken from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators; “great-circle” distances between the main industrial 
agglomerations of countries in the sample, taken from CEPII,
9 and dummy variables for 
common land borders, common official languages, and formal colonial ties. 
The “treatment variable” is equal to one when an inspection program is in force in the 
importing country j of a pair (i,j) at time t. It covers programs run by the largest four firms in 
the industry, Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS) and Cotecna Inspection SA, both based 
in Geneva; BIVAC International (a subsidiary of Paris-based Bureau Veritas), and Intertek, 
based in London. The list of programs is given in Appendix 1. 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics. For dummy variables, the mean is the proportion of the 
sample’s observations for which the variable is equal to one, i.e. the incidence of the variable.  
 
                                                             
9 So-called “great-circle” distances are simply the shortest routes along the earth’s surface, 




Figure 1 shows the percentage of importing countries with inspection programs in force over 
the sample period and the percentage of trade flows covered.  
Figure 1 
Percent of importing countries and trade flows covered by inspection programs, 1980-2006 
It can be seen that, at about 5%, the proportion of trade covered by inspection is much smaller 
than the proportion of countries with inspection programs in force (close to a quarter). This is 
because countries with inspection programs tend to be poor. Both proportions also rose 
roughly up to the mid-1990s, after which they peaked and showed a timid downward blip in 
the last year or so.  
2.2 Estimation 
Our basic equation is a Difference-in-Differences (DID) augmented-gravity equation in which 
the “treatment group” is the set of countries having used inspection programs and the “control 
group” is the set of countries never having used such programs. That is, let  ijt M  be the log of 
j’s aggregate imports from i in year t,  it y  and  jt y  the log of the exporter’s and importer’s 
GDPs in year t,   ij   the log of their distance,  ij X  a vector of time-invariant controls (common 
language, common border, past colonial ties),  i c  and  j c  exporter and importer fixed effects, 
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The estimate of  4   is the basic estimate of the average treatment effect for the treated. 
However, as discussed in the introduction, OLS estimates of (1) suffer from several possible 
sources of bias. First, as discussed in Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), possible serial 
correlation in the outcome variable (here trade) is exacerbated by very strong autocorrelation 
in the treatment variable (a binary variable that changes value only once or twice in the 
sample period). The result, they show, is a high probability of type-I error (rejecting the null 
hypothesis of no effect when it is true, i.e. when there is actually no effect).
10 We control this 
by using a two-step method suggested in their paper. In the first stage, we run a standard 
panel gravity equation for all countries and years and retrieve the residuals. In the second 
stage, we keep those residuals only for the treatment group (countries that had an inspection 
program at some point), take their without- and with-treatment averages, and run a panel 
regression on the resulting two-period panel with a dummy for the treatment period.  
In addition to autocorrelation issues, the coefficient on the treatment variable would provide 
an unbiased estimate of the effect of the treatment only if that treatment was randomly 
assigned, so that individuals who did not get it (the control group) were statistically identical 
to those who did (the treatment group). This is obviously not the case here since the treatment 
(an inspection program) is chosen by the individuals (the countries). Beyond the observable 
characteristics that may influence the decision to adopt an inspection program, which can be 
controlled for in the regression, there may be unobservable characteristics, picked up by the 
error term, that also influence the decision to adopt inspection programs. In that case the 
inspection variable would be correlated with the error term and all estimates would be 
inconsistent. Several fixes can be used, none of which is perfect (see Besley and Case 2001 for 
a discussion). 
First, country fixed effects control for time-invariant country characteristics that may 
simultaneously depress the country’s foreign trade and raise its probability of adopting 
inspection programs. However, fixed country effects do not control for time-variant omitted 
variables. To control for those, the treatment variable can be instrumented with variables 
correlated to it but not to the error term. The estimation procedure is implemented by Stata’s 
treatreg command and is akin to a Heckman two-stage procedure. The first stage is a probit 
regression of the treatment on the instruments and all exogenous variables, and the second 
stage is an OLS regression of the outcome variable on the treatment, all exogenous variables, 
                                                             
10 Performing repeated estimations on “manufactured data” with non-existent (placebo) 
treatments, they showed that the null was rejected in up to half the cases when it should be no 
more than 5% if standard errors had been correctly estimated.  Page | 11  
 
and the estimated hazard rate retrieved from the first stage. The two stages can also (and 
more efficiently) be estimated simultaneously by maximum-likelihood.
11  
The key issue is of course to find good instruments. We follow the approach suggested by 
Besley and Case (2001) and use political instruments taken from the World Bank’s worldwide 
governance database. Specifically, we use Kaufman’s governance index (the WB- Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) project
12) and its square, based on the idea that very corrupt 
and very honest governments would be reluctant to use inspection programs, the first because 
it would reduce corruption opportunities and the second because inspection would not be 
needed. This suggests that the probability of using an inspection program (the dependent 
variable in the first-stage probit) is a concave function of governance, something which can be 
captured by a second-degree polynomial. In some specifications, we also use IMF structural 
adjustment programs that were adopted simultaneously with PSI, as well as the official 
amount of  OECD aid per country per year. 
When no good instruments are available, the alternative route consists of using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and in particular Blundell and Bond’s system-GMM 
(Blundell and Bond 1998). The system-GMM estimator runs two simultaneous equations, one 
in levels and one in first differences, in which endogenous RHS variables in levels are 
instrumented by their lagged first differences in the level equation, and by their lagged levels 
in the differenced equation. Suitable instruments can of course be added in the levels equation 
if available. The number of lags used as instruments is the experimenter’s choice, and it has 
been argued that this latitude sometimes makes results unstable. There is however a rule of 
thumb which states that the number of lags should not be larger than the number of 
individuals in the panel. In our case, this rule of thumb is of course not binding because the 
number of lags is anyway severely limited by the panel’s short duration. We report GMM 




                                                             
11 Both options are available in Stata’s treatreg command, and results reported in this paper 
are based on the second method. 
12 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp Page | 12  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Baseline estimates 
Table 2 presents estimation results using OLS and instrumental-variable estimation.  
 Table 2 
Baseline results: OLS and IV  
Regression (a) gives OLS estimates (with importer, exporter and time effects) for comparison 
with instrumental-variable regressions. Regressions (b), (c) and (d) are two-stage treatment-
effect regressions where PSI is instrumented in three different ways. In (b), the first-stage 
regression (a probit) is on corruption and its square. As expected, the probability of observing 
a PSI program is a concave function of corruption control, but the turning point is around an 
index value of 10, so beyond the relevant range it rises in corruption control. Both instruments 
combined pass Sargan’s overidentification test. In (c) and (d), the first-stage regression is on a 
variety of instruments including other governance indicators, the amount of OECD aid and 
several dummy signaling the presence of World Bank Structural Adjustment Programs 
(identified in Appendix 2), which combined pass Sargan’s test in (c). Results are very similar 
both qualitatively and quantitatively.  
The coefficient on private inspection is stable across specifications and there is no significant 
bias in OLS estimation. Given the semi-log specification, the coefficient on private inspection 
is the percent increase (decrease) in trade associated with a change in the private inspection 
variable from zero to one. The estimates in Table 2 suggest an increase between 8% and 11.5%. 
While in a plausible range, these estimates are quite high, suggesting, if true, that with an 
average tariff rate of, say 10% private inspection would roughly just pay for itself even if it did 
nothing to tariff avoidance.  
3.2 Robustness 
Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 report several robustness exercises. First, while the baseline 
results are realized using exports data RHS, we check if they are robust to using mirror data 
instead. Table 3 presents the results with imports data RHS which are very similar with the 
results in Table 2. 
Error! Reference source not found.Table 3 Page | 13  
 
Robustness checks 1 : Mirror data 
Second, as discussed earlier, we follow the methodology suggested by Bertrand, Duflo and 
Mulainathan (2004, henceforth BDM) to verify that our diff-in-diff estimates are not driven 
by serial correlation. In that procedure, the first stage is a standard gravity equation without 
the treatment variable (private inspection), and the second stage regresses, for treated 
countries only, the average residuals from the first stage, averaged over pre- and post-
treatment periods, on the treatment variable. The sample for the second stage is thus a two-
period panel including private inspection countries only (9’884 observations). Results are 
reported in the first two columns of Table 4, labeled (a). It can be seen that private inspection 
remains significant at the 1% level with an estimated coefficient (0.104) that is just between 
the OLS and IV interval estimates (0.0804-0.115). This suggests that our positive and 
significant results from diff-in-diff estimation are not attributable to the over-rejection of the 
null hypothesis generated by serial correlation in the error term.Error! Reference source 
not found. 
Robustness checks 2 
Third, we re-run our treatment-effect regression but we “trick” the estimator by feeding in 
wrong dates for the start and end of private inspection programs. If we were to find significant 
estimates with the wrong dates, it would be likely that those estimates (and, by the same 
argument, those obtained with the right dates) were spurious. In regressions (b) and (c) in 
Table 4, we move the start and end dates of private inspection programs forward by 5 years 
and backward by 5 years. It can be seen that the estimates become insignificant, suggesting 
that the estimates in Table 2 are not spurious.  
Fourth, we re-estimate (1) by GMM (columns (d) and (e) in Table 4). Estimates are 
comparable with the exception of the coefficient on GDP exporter that is multiplied by 2 
comparing to its equivalent in the OLS estimation. Thus, it is necessary to be cautious about 
the magnitudes, although the qualitative results seem robust. The test for AR (2) in first 
differences rejects the null hypothesis of no autocorrelations in levels.  
Fifth, and perhaps more importantly, it may be argued that private inspection programs have 
been introduced as part of broader reform packages that sometimes included trade 
liberalization. If that was the case, the effect of private inspection would be confounded with 
that of trade liberalization and we would attribute to private inspection effects that do not 
belong to it. The first columns ((a), (b) and (c)) of Error! Reference source not found. 
show estimation results with a direct measure of trade liberalization included as an additional 
regressor. We used the binary trade-liberalization index constructed by Wacziarg and Welsh 
(2008), which takes into account a broad range of trade-policy measures to precisely identify 
the timing of trade-liberalization episodes. Wacziarg and Welsh’s index bears some similarity Page | 14  
 
with the celebrated Sachs-Warner index but excludes non-trade related components like the 
black-market premium on foreign exchange, and covers a broad range of years and countries. 
Including the Wacziarg-Welsh dummy to control for trade liberalization does not affect our 
central result.  
Table 5 
Robustness checks 3  
Finally, in the past, many studies used log GDPs as proxies for the importer and the exporter 
specific factors, which is currently considered to be the gold medal mistake (Baldwin and 
Taglioni, 2006). The current practice has been mostly moving towards using fixed effects 
instead (ex. Feenstra, 2003). As an alternative to fixed effects and also relevant for panel 
estimation is to calculate the multilateral resistance terms (also called remoteness). In 
particular Carrere, 2006 and Baier and Bergstrand, 2002 suggest to construct a proxy using  
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where N represents the total number of countries in the sample. 
The panel estimation enables one to estimate remoteness and to identify the country specific 
fixed effects at the same time and we show these results in columns (d) (e) and (f) of Table 5. 
The private inspection variable remains significant and comparable with previous results. 
All in all, at this stage it seems safe to say that private inspection seems to be robustly 
associated with an increase in bilateral trade volumes in a range centered around 5% and 
stretching between roughly 2% and 10%. Because our exercise is based on aggregate data, we 
cannot tell whether this increase is uniformly spread over product categories, so no inference 
should be drawn on the effect that private inspection can have on collected duties. Indeed, as 
discussed in the introduction, results so far are inconclusive on that front. Page | 15  
 
3.3 Extensions 
We add two extensions to the estimations above. First, we re-estimate (1) taking into account 
zero-trade values.
13. The first five columns of Table 6 show results using a Poisson estimator 
for five-year periods.  The estimated treatment effect is positive and significant for the last 
four periods, so qualitative results are unaffected. However, again the size is smaller. For 
2000-2004 it is a small 1.45%; while for earlier periods it is between 2.7% and 6%. For 1980-
84, it is negative, corresponding to a period where inspection programs had a different 
mission (see the earlier discussion). The last column reports Tobit marginal effects, which are 
in the same ballpark (5.47%). Thus, by and large the message is unaffected, although exact 
magnitudes may be closer to 2-5% than to 10%. 
Table 6 
Extension results 1 : Poisson and Tobit 
Second, we test the persistence of the effect of private inspection programs by preventing the 
PSI dummy switch to switch back to zero. The results are presented in Table 7. The effect of 
PSI is not proved persistent. The statistical results are mixed. Thus, the estimated coefficient 
for the persistent effect is significant for the OLS regression in column (a) and for one 
Treatreg specification with a longer sample, in column (d). It is insignificant in columns (b) 
and (c) that show treatreg specifications with each time with a shorter sample. The fact that 
the effect of PSI may not be always (for all countries and for all years) persistent was already 
remarked by Law, 1995 that indicates that the benefit of  private inspection programs remains 
visible only when the program is in place and that this program often does not seem to bring 
long term benefits to the country. Johnson, 2001 also remarks that the positive impact of PSI 
persists after the program removal only when the Institutions in the country undertake real 
reforms as well. He mentions the case of Philippines, Mexico and Argentina as positive 
examples. 
Table 7 
Extention results 2 : Test of persistent effect 
 
                                                             
13 Zero trade values were also replaced for missing trade values in two different cases – first, 
when trade values appeared missing for all 26 years from 1980 to 2005 and second when 
trade values were missing for at least 6 consecutive years after 1992.  Page | 16  
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Our results seem to suggest that the facilitation effect of private inspection is statistically 
traceable in trade data. Using bilateral export volumes as our variable of interest (in order to 
avoid picking up the effect of improved bookkeeping on the importing side, which would have 
no “real” counterpart) we find that private inspection seems to have been associated with an 
increase in trade between 5% and 10%. Thus, as conjectured at the start of this paper, the 
burden of inspection and paperwork associated with inspection seems to have been more than 
offset by improved facilitation at destination. Indeed, anecdotal evidence seems to suggest 
that at least some surveillance companies have implemented programs to foster the adoption 
of best practices at destination ports and customs, including container tracking systems, 
electronic payment of duties, and so on. Technology is clearly part of the story. For instance, 
recent destination inspection programs have spread the use of scanners in lieu of physical 
inspection (physical inspection being reserved for suspicious cases). The spread of control 
systems in international trade may thus be similarly associated with improved logistics and 
enhanced used of information systems which may, in the end, facilitate transit rather than 
hampering it.  
 Page | 17  
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Country  Period  Company  Type of contract  Contract value 
a/ 
1979-2001 SGS  Exclusive  15 
Jan 2002-Jun 2005  Cotecna     
 
Angola 
2002-2006 BIVAC     
Argentina 1998-2001  SGS  Importer’s  Choice  25 
1994-1997 SGS  Geographical  10  Bangladesh  Nov 1994-Jan 1999/Sept 2005 - 2006 Cotecna  3 other companies involved   
Belarus 1997-1999  BIVAC     
Jan 1991 - Jan 1996  Cotecna  Exclusive    Benin  2001-2006 BIVAC     
Bolivia 1986-1987/1990-2003  SGS  Importer's  Choice  10 
1992-2004 SGS  Exclusive  5  Burkina Faso  July 2004-2005  Cotecna  Exclusive   
Burundi 1978-2008  SGS  Exclusive  1 
1995-1999/2000-2004 SGS  Exclusive  3  Cambodia  2005-2006 BIVAC     
Cameroon 1988-2006  SGS  Exclusive  15 
1990-2003 SGS  Exclusive  1  Central Afr. Rep.  2004-2006 BIVAC     
Sept 1994-Jan 1996  Cotecna  Exclusive    Chad  2004-2006 BIVAC     
Colombia  95- Feb 1998-Jun 1999  Cotecna  1 other company involved   
Comoros 1995-2005  Cotecna  Exclusive   
1993-1998 SGS  Exclusive  2  Congo (Brazzaville)  2001-2006 BIVAC/Cotecna    
1965-2006 SGS  Exclusive  3  Congo (Dem. Rep.)  2006 BIVAC     
1975-2000 SGS  Exclusive  15 
Jul 2000-Mar 2005  Cotecna  1 other company involved    Cote D'ivoire 
2006 BIVAC     
Djibouti  Jun 1996-Nov 1997  Cotecna  Exclusive   
Dominican Republic  Apr 2003-Apr 2005  Cotecna  Exclusive   
1985-1988/1994-2006 SGS  Importer's  Choice  12  Ecuador  1994-2005  Cotecna  3 other companies involved   
Equat. Guinea  1982-1989  SGS  Exclusive  0.1 
Ethiopia 1993-1995/2000-2004  SGS  Exclusive  10 
1971-1997 SGS  Geographical  Split  6  Ghana  Aug1994-2005  Cotecna  2 other companies involved   
Gambia 2001-2002  BIVAC     
Georgia 1999-2001  Intertek     
Guatemala 1986-1987  SGS  Exclusive  3 
Guinea (Conakry)  1996-2004  SGS  Exclusive  6 
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a/ In million US$ (current) 
Source: industry data 
Country  Period  Company  Type of contract  Contract value 
a/ 
Haiti 1983-1994/2003-2006  SGS  Exclusive  1/3 
India 2001-2006  SGS  Exporter/Importer  Choice  n.a. 
Indonesia 1985-1997/2003-2006  SGS  Exclusive  2 
Irak  Feb 1998-Oct 2004  Cotecna  Exclusive   
Iran 1996-2006  SGS  Importer's  Choice  3 
Jamaica 1985-1988  SGS  Exclusive  4 
Kazakhstan 1995-1997  SGS  Exclusive  11 
1972-1990/1994-1999 SGS  Geographical  Split  3/10  Kenya  Jan 1988 –June 2005  Cotecna  2/1 other companies involved   
Laos 2001-2002  BIVAC     
1985-1997 SGS  Exclusive  4  Liberia  1997-2006 BIVAC     
1983-1991/2003-2007 SGS  Exclusive  12  Madagascar  1993-2002 BIVAC     
1989-1997/2001-2003 SGS  Exclusive  5  Malawi  2004-2006 Intertek     
1989-2003 SGS  Exclusive  7 
Oct 2003-2005  Cotecna  Exclusive    Mali 
2007 Intertek     
Mauritania 1994-1995/1999-2001/2004-2005  SGS  Exclusive  2 
1985-2006 SGS  Importer's  Choice  1  Mexico  Mar 2006-  Cotecna  2 other companies involved   
Moldova 2001-2003  SGS  Exclusive  4 
1991-1996 SGS  Exclusive  5  Mozambique  2001-2006 Intertek     
Niger 1996-2005  Cotecna  Exclusive   
1979-1984/1990-1997/1999-2006 SGS  Geographical  Split  30  Nigeria  1984-1997/1999-2006  Cotecna  3 other companies involved   
1995-1997 SGS  Geographical  Split  45  Pakistan  Jul 1990-Nov 1991/Jan 1995-Mar.1997 Cotecna  1 other company involved   
Paraguay 1983-1988/1996-1999  SGS  Importer's  Choice  20 
1987-1989/1992-2004 SGS  Importer's  Choice  25  Peru  Mar 1992-May 2004  Cotecna  2 other companies involved   
Philippines 1986-2000  SGS  Exclusive  112 
Rwanda 1977-2003  SGS  Exclusive  2 
1991-2001 SGS  Importer's  Choice  7  Senegal  Oct 2001-2005  Cotecna  Exclusive   
1990-2003 BIVAC      Sierra Leone  2004-2006 Intertek     
Somalia Sept  1990  -1991  Cotecna  Exclusive   
Suriname 1982-1990  SGS  Exclusive  0.5 
1972-1998 SGS  Exclusive  9  Tanzania  Sep 1992-April 1995/1999-2005  Cotecna  with SGS and then Exclusive   
1988-1989 SGS  Exclusive  4  Togo  1995-2006 Cotecna  Exclusive  
1982-1998 SGS  Exclusive  4  Uganda  2001 Intertek     
Uzbekistan 2001-2007  SGS  Importer's  Choice  2 
1986-1989/2003-2005 SGS  Importer's  Choice  40  Venezuela  Sept 2003-Aug 2005  Cotecna  3 other companies involved   
Zambia 1977-1998  SGS  Exclusive  5 
Zanzibar 1982-2004  SGS  Exclusive  0.1 




Programs adopted simultaneously with IMF Structural Adjustment Programs 
 
Source: Authors analysis and IMF programs database constructed by Dreher, Axel, IMF and 
Economic Growth: The Effects of Programs, Loans, and Compliance with Conditionality, 
World Development 34, 5: 769-788 (2006). 
IMF Extended Fund Facility (EFF) 
IMF Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF) 
IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) 
IMF Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)  
Country Year  IMF Program  Notes 
Argentina 1998  EFF   
Bangladesh 2003  PRGF   
Benin  1991  SAF   In place since1989 
Bolivia 1986  SBA   
Burkina Faso  1992  SAF   In place since 1991 
Burundi 1987  SAF   
Cambodia  1995  PRGF   In place since 1994 
Cameroon  1989  SBA   In place since 1988 
Chad 1994  SBA   
Congo (Roc)  1994  SBA   
Cote D`Ivoire  1981  EFF   
Djibouti 1996  SBA   
Dominican Rep  2004  SBA   In place since 2003 
Ecuador 1985  SBA   
Eq Guinea  1985  SBA   
Ethiopia  1993  SAF   In place since 1992 
Gambia 2001  PRGF   
Georgia  1999  PRGF   In place since 1995 
Ghana 1984  SBA   
Guinea 1996  PRGF   
Haiti 1983  SBA   
Jamaica 1985  SBA   
Kazakhstan 1995  SBA   
Kenya 1980  SBA   
Madagascar 1983  SBA   
Malawi 1989  PRGF   
Mali 1989  SAF+SBA   
Mauritania 1994  PRGF   
Mexico  1985  EFF   In place since 1983 
Moldova 2001  PRGF   
Mozambique 1991  PRGF   
Niger 1996  PRGF   
Nigeria 1987  SBA   
Peru 1993  EFF   
Philippines 1986  SBA   
Rwanda 1980  SBA   
Sierra Leone  1994  PRGF   
Tanzania 1981  SBA   
Togo 1988  SAF+SBA   
Uganda 1982  SBA   
Venezuela 1989  EFF   
Zambia 1981  EFF   
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Tables and Figure 
Tables 





















Notes : For dummy variables, the mean is the proportion of observations for which the variable is equal to one, i.e. the variable’s sample incidence. 
Values Log
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Exports (US$ th.) 538'362 175539.50 2271267.00 0.00 303000000 7.84 3.64 -4.61 19.53
Distance 670'566 7438.38 4382.42 39.43 19904.45 8.67 0.80 3.67 9.90
Importer's GDP 618'121 1.67E+11 7.29E+11 2.06E+07 1.24E+13 2.32E+01 2.38E+00 1.68E+01 3.02E+01
Exporter's GDP 615'315 1.75E+11 7.45E+11 4.08E+07 1.24E+13 2.33E+01 2.34E+00 1.75E+01 3.02E+01
Importer's GDP/ cap 587'844 7272.45 7989.35 336.20 60228.41 8.31 1.13 5.82 11.01
Exporter's GDP/ cap 587'268 7407.10 8108.80 336.20 60228.41 8.31 1.13 5.82 11.01
Private inspection 670'566 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Common language 670'566 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
Colony 670'566 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00
Common border 670'566 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
Control of Corruption 250'399 50.95 29.04 0.00 100.00 50.95 29.04 0.00 100.00
Voice & Accountability 254'308 50.06 28.78 1.00 100.00 50.06 28.78 1.00 100.00
Political Stability 251'790 48.15 28.62 0.00 100.00 48.15 28.62 0.00 100.00
Governance Effectiveness 253'758 51.91 28.84 0.00 100.00 51.91 28.84 0.00 100.00
Regulatory Quality 253'775 51.72 28.31 0.00 100.00 51.72 28.31 0.00 100.00
Rule of Law 252'563 50.03 28.84 0.00 100.00 50.03 28.84 0.00 100.00
IMF SAF 537'000 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
IMF PRGF 537'000 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
IMF EFF 537'000 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
IMF SBA 537'000 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00 0.15 0.35 0.00 1.00
Aid/cap (US$) 565'500 45.87 71.80 -203.59 1294.42 3.09 1.53 -6.12 7.17Page | 24  
 
Table 2  Baseline estimation results 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
OLS
(a) (b) (c) (d)
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Constant -10.83*** 0.444 4.865*** 4.906***
(0.54) (1.14) (1.610) (1.61)
Gravity variables
Distance -1.567*** -1.648*** -1.701*** -1.693***
(0.0058) (0.0082) (0.0102) (0.010)
Importer's GDP 0.565*** 0.618*** 0.667*** 0.669***
(0.014) (0.035) (0.0404) (0.040)
Exporter's' GDP 0.655*** 0.281*** 0.105** 0.108**
(0.016) (0.036) (0.0461) (0.046)
Colony 1.190*** 1.130*** 0.931*** 0.934***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.0393) (0.039)
Comlang 0.682*** 0.777*** 0.865*** 0.861***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.0209) (0.021)
Contingency 0.500*** 0.623*** 0.795*** 0.812***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.0394) (0.039)
Treatment
PSI 0.0811*** 0.0894* 0.0976* 0.119**
(0.017) (0.049) (0.0591) (0.058)
Instruments 1
Control of Corruption 0.0123*** 0.000745 0.0320***
(0.00079) (0.000852) (0.0012)
Control of Corruption (square) -0.000576*** -0.000363*** -0.000543*
(0.000010) (1.06e-05) (0.000015)
Voice & Accountability 0.0751***
(0.0012)












Regulatory Quality (square) 0.000329*
(0.000016)
Instruments 2
Aid a\ -0.182*** -0.240***
(0.00347) (0.0043)
IMF PRGF c\ 0.956*** 1.024***
(0.0118) (0.013)
IMF EFF d\ -0.249***
(0.021)
IMF SBA e\ -0.295***
(0.017)
Observations 306'223 156'856 156'856 107,005 107,005 106'264 106'264
R-squared 0.71
Sargan’s overidentification test (chi2/prob)  0.0679 0.0788 0
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Table 3  Robustness checks 1 – Mirror data 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS
(a) (b) (c)
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Constant -7.666 -4.415*** -0.239
(0.55) (1.199) (1.531)
Gravity variables
Distance -1.511*** -1.565*** -1.598***
(0.00561) (0.00800) (0.00981)
Importer's GDP 0.504*** 0.622*** 0.704***
(0.0147) (0.0352) (0.0415)
Exporter's' GDP 0.648*** 0.259*** 0.0804*
(0.0155) (0.0354) (0.0458)
Colony 1.155*** 1.081*** 1.008***
(0.0208) (0.0312) (0.0431)
Comlang 0.717*** 0.834*** 0.941***
(0.0123) (0.0177) (0.0211)
Contingency 0.456*** 0.621*** 0.819***
(0.0249) (0.0358) (0.0404)
Treatment
PSI 0.121*** 0.109*** 0.0919*
(0.0167) (0.0360) (0.0489)
Instruments 1
Control of Corruption 0.0139*** 0.0218***
(0.000784) (0.00137)
Control of Corruption (square) -0.000585*** -0.000284*
(1.00e-05) (1.82e-05)
Voice & Accountability 0.0707***
(0.00120)

















IMF PRGF c\ 1.040***
(0.0132)
IMF EFF d\ -0.329***
(0.0203)
IMF SBA e\ -0.343***
(0.0164)
Observations 322,813 165,226 165,226 110,897 110,897
R-squared 0.715
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Table 4  Robustness checks 2 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
GMM GMM
(d) (e)
1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage
Constant -10.70*** 0.193 0.185 -34.29*** -33.93***
(0.54) (1.14) (1.14) (0.24) (0.23)
Gravity variables
Distance -1.567*** -1.648*** -1.648*** -1.384*** -1.364***
(0.0058) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0038) (0.0038)
Importer's GDP 0.557*** 0.633*** 0.633*** 0.851*** 0.813***
(0.014) (0.035) (0.035) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Exporter's' GDP 0.655*** 0.280*** 0.280*** 1.376*** 1.375***
(0.016) (0.036) (0.036) (0.0065) (0.0067)
Colony 1.190*** 1.130*** 1.130*** 0.862*** 0.839***
(0.021) (0.031) (0.031) (0.022) (0.020)
Common language 0.682*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 0.943*** 0.923***
(0.013) (0.018) (0.018) (0.010) (0.0099)
Common border 0.500*** 0.623*** 0.623*** 0.811*** 0.936***
(0.025) (0.035) (0.035) (0.015) (0.016)
Treatment







Control of Corruption 0.0129*** 0.00666*** 0.00663***
(0.00081) (0.00083) (0.00040)
Control of Corruption (square) -0.000572*** -0.000410*** 0.0000200
(0.000010) (0.000010) (0.000004
Observations 306'223 12'079 156'856 156'856 156'856 156'856 159'226 156'856
R-squared
AR2 (Pr > z)  0.71 00
(a)
Treatreg
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Table 5  Robustness checks 3 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
OLS OLS
(a) (d)
2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 1st stage
Constant -4.666*** -1.206 -4.633*** -30.08*** 3.368 3.339
-0.93 -1.29 -0.93 (2.941) (6.185) (6.186)
-1.567*** -1.648*** -1.648***
Distance -1.534*** -1.572*** -1.534*** (0.00584) (0.00820) (0.00820)
-0.0076 -0.0091 -0.0076 0.559*** 0.589*** 0.590***
Importer's GDP 0.559*** 0.613*** 0.562*** (0.0149) (0.0367) (0.0366)
-0.026 -0.039 -0.026 0.627*** 0.316*** 0.316***
Exporter's' GDP 0.473*** 0.289*** 0.473*** (0.0170) (0.0386) (0.0386)
-0.027 -0.039 -0.027 1.189*** 1.130*** 1.130***
Colony 1.171*** 1.159*** 1.171*** (0.0207) (0.0307) (0.0307)
-0.027 -0.033 -0.027 0.681*** 0.778*** 0.778***
Common language 0.767*** 0.776*** 0.767*** (0.0126) (0.0178) (0.0178)
-0.016 -0.02 -0.016 0.500*** 0.622*** 0.622***
Common border 0.696*** 0.710*** 0.697*** (0.0248) (0.0352) (0.0352)
-0.031 -0.038 -0.031
Trade openess (Wacziarg-Welsh) 1.466*** 1.842*** 1.472***
-0.16 -0.28 -0.16
Remoteness exporter 0.772*** -0.708*** -0.708***
(0.0950) (0.187) (0.187)
Remoteness importer 0.198* 0.604*** 0.604***
(0.104) (0.210) (0.210)
PSI 0.110*** 0.0855* 0.129*** 0.0804*** 0.0898* 0.112**
-0.023 -0.046 -0.027 (0.0167) (0.0494) (0.0517)
Control of Corruption 0.000624 0.0123*** -0.000621
-0.00092 (0.000791) (0.000846)
Control of Corruption (square) -0.000576*** -0.000368*
(1.01e-05) (1.06e-05)
Voice & Accountability 0.0269*** 0.0436***
-0.0009 (0.000797)
Voice & Accountability (square) -0.000598*
-0.000011 (9.94e-06)
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Table 6  Extension results 1 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 













(a) (b) (c (d) (e) (f)
Constant -36.01 -42.55 -48.27 -43.87 -9.951*** -2.152***
(2560) (1625) (6730) (3326) (0.28) (0.63)
Gravity variables
Distance -0.772*** -0.740*** -0.725*** -0.715*** -0.726*** -1.560***
(0.00027) (0.00031) (0.00039) (0.00050) (0.00057) (0.0073)
Importer's GDP 0.605*** 0.708*** 0.582*** 0.517*** 0.511*** 0.880***
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.026)
Exporter's' GDP 0.469*** 0.328*** 0.407*** 0.426*** 0.516*** 0.337***
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0037) (0.026)
Colony 0.0452*** 0.0220*** -0.0174*** 0.0233*** 0.309*** 1.058***
(0.00079) (0.00091) (0.0011) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.033)
Common language 0.154*** 0.184*** 0.343*** 0.359*** 0.182*** 0.744***
(0.00070) (0.00085) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.016)
Common border 0.556*** 0.614*** 0.500*** 0.380*** 0.325*** 0.574***
(0.00072) (0.00085) (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0016) (0.029)
Treatment
PSI 0.0145*** 0.0271*** 0.0611*** 0.0564*** -0.217*** 0.0547**
(0.0025) (0.0032) (0.0064) (0.0069) (0.019) (0.026)
Observations 123'569 123'254 100'502 82'150 70'892 223'163Page | 29  
 
 
Table 7  Extension results 2 
 
 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
OLS
(a) (b) (c) (d)
Second  First stage Second  First stage Second  First stage
Constant -8.228*** -3.714*** 0.0776 -9.486***
(0.509) (1.366) (1.485) (0.645)
Gravity variables
Distance -1.567*** -1.648*** -1.693*** -1.640***
(0.00583) (0.00820) (0.0102) (0.00733)
Importer's GDP 0.573*** 0.635*** 0.683*** 0.601***
(0.0147) (0.0350) (0.0408) (0.0168)
Exporter's' GDP 0.655*** 0.280*** 0.107** 0.505***
(0.0164) (0.0365) (0.0461) (0.0211)
Colony 1.190*** 1.130*** 0.934*** 1.040***
(0.0207) (0.0307) (0.0394) (0.0268)
Comlang 0.682*** 0.778*** 0.861*** 0.716***
(0.0126) (0.0178) (0.0210) (0.0146)
Contingency 0.500*** 0.623*** 0.813*** 0.660***
(0.0248) (0.0352) (0.0394) (0.0279)
Treatment
PSI persistent - dummy equals once PSI adopted  0.0938*** 0.0626 0.0290 0.182***
(0.0190) (0.0640) (0.0668) (0.0351)
Instruments 1
Control of Corruption 0.0105*** -0.0144***
(0.000808) (0.00147)
Control of Corruption (square) -0.000646*** 0.000172***
(1.06e-05) (1.88e-05)
Voice & Accountability 0.0864***
(0.00124)












Regulatory Quality (square) 8.59e-05***
(1.67e-05)
Instruments 2
Aid a\ -0.298*** -0.108***
(0.00446) (0.00191)
IMF PRGF c\ 0.977*** 1.356***
(0.0139) (0.00841)
IMF EFF d\ -0.113*** 0.346***
(0.0211) (0.0120)
IMF SBA e\ -0.392*** 0.157***
(0.0165) (0.00838)
Observations 306,223 156,856 156,856 106,264 106,264 212,357 212,357
R-squared 0.705






Percent of importing countries and trade flows covered by private inspection, 1980-2006 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, DOTS, Industry. 
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